Let G be a game defined by an extended utility function g_p of player p; a function $\mathrm{seq}(i)$, which returns the sequence leading to the information set i; a function $A(i)$, which returns the actions available at infoset I; and finally, I_p, and S_p, which are sets of infosets, and sequences of player p respectively. For clarity, we subscript the functions with the player they belong to.

The optimal value of the following sequence-form linear program is equal the utility of the first player.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\max_{v,\,r} \quad & \left(\sum_{s_0 \in S_0} g_0(s_0, \text{«»}) \cdot r_{s_0}\right) + \sum_{\substack{j \in I_1 \\ \mathrm{seq}_1(j) = \text{«»}}} v_j \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \left(\sum_{s_0 \in S_0} g_0(s_0, \sigma_1 a) \cdot r_{s_0}\right) + \sum_{\substack{j \in I_1 \\ \mathrm{seq}_1(j) = \sigma_1 a}} v_j \geq v_i \qquad \forall i \in I_1, \forall a \in A_1(i), \sigma_1 \coloneqq \mathrm{seq}_1(i), \\
& \sum_{a \in A_0(i)} r_{\sigma_0 a} = r_{\sigma_0} \qquad \forall i \in I_0, \sigma_0 \coloneqq \mathrm{seq}_0(i), \\
& r_{\text{«»}} = 1
\end{aligned}
$$

where the variables v can achieve any real value $\forall i \in I_1, v_i \in \mathbb{R}$; the r variables are probabilistic $\forall s \in S_0, r_s \in [0,1]$; the symbol «» denotes the sequence of no actions; and the juxtaposition σx of a sequence σ followed by an action x appends the action to the sequence.