


# Uncertainty, Chance, and Utilities

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Vision for Robots and Autonomous Systems, Center for Machine Perception  
Department of Cybernetics  
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague

March 22, 2023


## Deterministic opponent $\rightarrow$ stochastic environment



$b_1, b_2, b_3$  - stochastic branches, uncertain outcomes of  $a_1$  action.

CHANCE nodes are "virtual",  $b_1, b_2, b_3$  are not actions!


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
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## Why? Actions may fail, . . .



Video: Slipping robot. Vision for Robotics and Autonomous Systems, <http://cyber.felk.cvut.cz/vras>, <https://youtu.be/kvEEHNyCHMs>

## Why? Action costs not deterministic, . . . , getting to work

A At home

*tram*    *bike*    *car*

Random variable: Function mapping situation on rails to values  $T(r_i) = t_i$ :


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MAX/MIN depends on what the  $t_i$  options and terminal numbers mean. The goal may be to get to work as fast as possible.

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
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
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
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
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
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## Chance nodes values




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
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
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## Random variables, probability distribution, ...

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- ▶ **Probability distribution** - assignment of probabilities (weights) to the values



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
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
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
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## Expectations, ...

How long does it take to go to work by tram?

- ▶ Depends on the random variable  $T$  with possible values  $t_1, t_2, t_3$  (corresponding to situation on rails).
- ▶ What is the **expectation** of the time?

Using values  $t_1, t_2, t_3$  of random variable  $T$ :

$$E(T) = P(t_1)t_1 + P(t_2)t_2 + P(t_3)t_3$$

Or, using random outcomes  $r_1, r_2, r_3$ :

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Expected value of a discrete r.v.: **Weighted average**

## Expectimax

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function EXPECTIMAX(state) return a value
  if IS-TERMINAL(state): return UTILITY(state)
  if state (next agent) is MAX: return MAX-VALUE(state)
  if state (next agent) is CHANCE: return EXP-VALUE(state)
end function
```

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function MAX-VALUE(state) return value  $v$ 
   $v \leftarrow -\infty$ 
  for  $a$  in ACTIONS(state) do
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  end for
end function
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function EXP-VALUE(state) return value  $v$ 
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
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- ▶ Is there any space for randomness?
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# Games with chance and strategy



## Random variable: Throwing two dice

Do we care which die comes first?

What is the probability of , ?<sup>1</sup>

A  $1/24$

B  $1/36$

C  $1/18$


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
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
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# Mixing MAX, CHANCE, and MIN nodes

MAX 0. (MAX) I throw dices

1. (MAX) I play

CHANCE

2. (MIN) Opponent throws dices

MIN

3. (MIN) Opponent plays


CHANCE

4. (MAX) I throw dices

MAX

TERMINAL

2 -1 1 -1 1





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
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

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MAX

TERMINAL





# Mixing layer types - chances inserted



Extra random agent types that moves after each MAX and MIN agent

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(s) &= \\
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



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

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
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# Mixing chance into min/max tree. How big is the tree going to be?



- ▶  $b$  branching factor
- ▶  $m$  maximum depth
- ▶  $n$  number of distinct rolls

What is the time complexity of EXPECTIMINIMAX?

- A  $O(b^{mn})$
- B  $O(b^m n)$
- C  $O(b^m n^b)$
- D  $O(b^m n^m)$





# Evaluation function

MAX

CHANCE

MIN





- ▶ Left:  $a_1$  is the best. Right:  $a_2$  is the best. Ordering of the (terminal) leaves is the same.
- ▶ Scale matters! Not only ordering.
- ▶ Can we prune the tree? ( $\alpha, \beta$  like?)

# Evaluation function

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CHANCE

MIN



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

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

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
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
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# Pruning expectiminimax tree



- ▶ Bounds on terminal utilities needed. Terminal values from  $-2$  to  $2$ .
- ▶ Monte Carlo simulation for evaluation of a position (state).


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


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
## Where to prune the Expectimax tree

- ▶ Assume terminal nodes bounded to  $-2$  to  $2$ , inclusive
- ▶ Going from left to right.
- ▶ Which branches can be pruned out?







A



B



C




D

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# Multi-player games


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- ▶ Utility tuples
- ▶ Each player maximizes its own
- ▶ Coalitions, cooperations, competitions may be dynamic

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## Uncertainty recap (enough games, back to the robots/agents)



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
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## Uncertainty recap (enough games, back to the robots/agents)



- ▶ Uncertain outcome of an action.
- ▶ Robot/Agent may not know the current state!

# Uncertain outcome of an action



**Video: Climbing stairs failure, From: <http://robotics.fel.cvut.cz/cras/darpa-subt/>**

# Uncertain, partially observable environment



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- ▶ Current state  $s$  may be unknown, observations  $e$

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# Rational agent

Agent's expected utility of an action  $a$  given  $\mathbf{e}$ :

$$EU(a|\mathbf{e}) = \sum_{s'} P(\text{RESULT}(a) = s' | a, \mathbf{e}) U(s')$$

What should a rational agent do?

Is it then all solved? Do we know all what we need?

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# Utilities



- ▶ Where do utilities come from?
- ▶ Does averaging make sense?
- ▶ Do they exist?
- ▶ What if our preferences can't be described by utilities?

# Agent/Robot Preferences

- ▶ Prizes  $A, B$
- ▶ Lottery: uncertain prizes  $L = [p, A; (1 - p), B]$

Preference, indifference, ...

- ▶ Robot prefers  $A$  over  $B$ :  $A \succ B$
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## Rational preferences

- ▶ Transitivity:  $(A \succ B) \wedge (B \succ C) \Rightarrow (A \succ C)$
- ▶ Completeness:  $(A \succ B) \vee (B \succ A) \vee (A \sim B)$
- ▶ Continuity:  $(A \succ B \succ C) \Rightarrow \exists p [p, A; 1 - p, C] \sim B$
- ▶ Substituability:  $A \sim B \Rightarrow [p, A; 1 - p, C] \sim [p, B; 1 - p, C]$ . The same for  $\succ$  and  $\sim$ .
- ▶ Monotonicity:  $A \succ B \Rightarrow (p > q) \Leftrightarrow [p, A; 1 - p, B] \succ [q, A; 1 - q, B]$ . Agent must prefer a lottery with higher chance to win.
- ▶ Decomposability, compressing compound lotteries into one:  
 $[p, A; 1 - p, [q, B; 1 - q, C]] \sim [p, A; (1 - p)q, B; (1 - p)(1 - q), C]$

Axioms of utility theory.

Motivation: if agent/robot violates an axiom  $\Rightarrow$  irrational agent/robot.

## Rational preferences


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
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## Transitivity and decomposability


Goods  $A, B, C$  and (nontransitive) preferences of an (irrational) agent  $A \succ B \succ C \succ A$ .



(a)



is equivalent to



(b)

## Maximum expected utility principle

Given the rational preferences (constraints), there exists a real valued function  $u$  such that:

$$u(A) > u(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succ B$$

$$u(A) = u(B) \Leftrightarrow A \sim B$$

Expected utility of a Lottery  $L$  (outcomes  $s_i$  with probabilities  $p_i$ ):

$$L([p_1, S_1; \dots; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i u(S_i)$$

Proof in [5].

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# Human utilities




## Utility of money



You triumphed in a TV show!

- a) Take \$1,000,000 ... or
- b) Flip a coin and loose all or win \$2,500,000

# Utility of money: human psychology vs. hard data



# Utility of money: human psychology vs. hard data



## References I

Some figures from [3], Chapters 5, 16. Human utilities are discussed in [2]. This lecture has been also greatly inspired by the 7th lecture of CS 188 at <http://ai.berkeley.edu> as it conveniently bridges the world of deterministic search and sequential decisions in uncertain worlds.

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[2] Daniel Kahneman.

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- [5] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.  
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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory\\_of\\_Games\\_and\\_Economic\\_Behavior](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Games_and_Economic_Behavior), Utility theorem.