Probabilistic classification

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April 21, 2021

(Re-)introduction uncertainty/probability

- ► Markov Decision Processes (MDP) uncertainty about outcome of actions
- Now: uncertainty may be also associated with states
 - ▶ Different states may have different prior probabilities.
 - ▶ The states $s \in S$ may not be directly observable .
 - ▶ They need to be inferred from features $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- ▶ This is addressed by the rules of probability (such as Bayes theorem) and leads on to
 - ► Bayesian classification
 - Bayesian decision making

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
Notes

Just a reminder: MDPs, value iteration and policy iteration methods. We were looking for an optimal policy $\pi: \mathcal{S} \to \mathcal{A}$.

Probability example: Picking fruits

red box: 2 apples, 6 oranges

▶ blue box: 3 apples, 1 orange



► Scenario: Pick a box—say red box in 40% cases—, then pick a fruit at random.

(Frequent) questions:


▶ What is the overall probability that the selection procedure will pick an apple?

Given that we have chosen an orange, what is the probability that the box we chose was the blue one?

Example from Chapter 1.2 [1]

Picking fruits. What is the probability that ...?

- red box: 2 apples, 6 oranges
- ▶ blue box: 3 apples, 1 orange



Procedure: Pick a box (say red box in 40% cases), then pick a fruit at random.

What is the probability that the selection procedure will pick an apple?

- A: 11/20
- B: 6/8
- C: 1/2
- D: Different value.

Notes

Example serves for probability recap (sum, product rules, conditional probabilities, Bayes) Random variables:

- Identity of the box B, two possible values r, b
- Identity of the fruit F, two possible values a, o

Info about picking a box:

- P(B = r) = 0.4
- P(B = b) = 0.6

Conditional probabilities, given box selected: P(o|r) = 3/4, P(a|r) = 1/4, P(o|b) = 1/4, P(a|b) = 3/4. Answering questions:

- P(F = a) = P(a|r)P(r) + P(a|b)P(b) = (2/8) * (4/10) + (3/4) * (6/10) = 11/20
- P(B = b|F = o) = P(b|o)


$$P(b|o) = \frac{P(o|b)P(b)}{P(o)} = \frac{P(o|b)P(b)}{P(o|b)P(b) + P(o|r)P(r)} = 1/3$$

P(B) prior probability – before we observe the fruit.

P(B|F) aposteriori probability – after we observe the fruit.

Picking fruits. What is the probability that ...?

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Procedure: Pick a box (say red box in 40% cases), then pick a fruit at random.

Given that we have chosen an orange, what is the probability that the box we chose was the blue one?

- A: 1/4
- B: 3/5
- C: 1/3
- D: Different value.

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Rules of probability and notation I

- \triangleright random variables X, Y
- \triangleright x_i where i = 1, ..., M values taken by variable X
- \triangleright y_i where j=1,...,L values taken by variable Y
- ▶ $P(X = x_i, Y = y_i)$ probability that X takes the value x_i and Y takes y_i joint probability
- ▶ $P(X = x_i)$ probability that X takes the value x_i
- ► Sum rule of probability :
 - $P(X = x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{L} P(X = x_i, Y = y_j)$
 - ▶ $P(X = x_i)$ is sometimes called marginal probability obtained by marginalizing / summing out the other variables
 - general rule, compact notation: $P(X) = \sum_{Y} P(X, Y)$

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Notes

This and the following slides are just to formally recap what we learned when discussing boxes and fruits

Rules of probability and notation II

- Conditional probability : $P(Y = y_i | X = x_i)$
- Product rule of probability :
 - $P(X = x_i, Y = y_i) = P(Y = y_i | X = x_i)P(X = x_i)$
 - peneral rule, compact notation: P(X, Y) = P(Y|X)P(X)
- ► Bayes theorem :
 - from P(X, Y) = P(Y, X) and product rule

$$P(Y|X) = \frac{P(X|Y)P(Y)}{P(X)}$$

$$\textit{posterior} = \frac{\textit{likelihood} \times \textit{prior}}{\textit{evidence}}$$

Independence: P(X|Y) = P(X)P(Y)

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Notes

What does is mean when we say that random variables X and Y are independent?

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
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Boxes and Fruits: posterior? likelihood? prior? evidence?

$$posterior = rac{likelihood imes prior}{evidence}$$



Connect with lines:

posteriorafter observation

► *P*(*B*)

► likelihood of an observation

► *P*(*F*)

priorbefore observation

► *P*(*F* | *B*)

evidence total observations ▶ P(B | F)

Notes

Boxes and Fruits:

- prior (before observation) P(B)
- likelihood (of observation) P(F|B)
- evidence (total observations) P(F)
- posterior (after observation) P(B|F)

Think about these terms, it helps to understand and remember.

A doctor calls: "Your HIV test is positive, 999/1000 you will die in 10 years. I'm sorry ...". Insurance company does not want to insure a married couple.

- Was the doctor right?
- ► Was the insurance company rational?

What the doctor (and the company) knew:

► HIV test falsely positive only in 1 case out of 1000.

Notes -

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- Doctor: $P(\text{positive test} \mid \text{healthy}) = \frac{1}{1000}$ but this is the *likelihood* which we learn before the patient's diagnosis (classification).
- More interesting and important is to know: $P(\text{healthy} \mid \text{positive test})$ (posterior).
- Think about 10000 samples of heterosexual males, family, Statistically, there is just 1 HIV positive among them.
- Assume $P(\text{negative test} \mid \text{infected}) \rightarrow 0$. (false negative rate)
- 1 person HIV positive will be tested positive, but also 10 other healthy persons will be tested positive. Hence $P(\text{healthy} \mid \text{positive test}) = 10/11$.
- Or, for the doctor: $P(\text{infected} \mid \text{positive test}) = \frac{1}{11}$ and not $\frac{999}{1000}$.
- The fact that a disease is rare matters a lot!

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What is the probability the man is infected?

- A: $\frac{1}{1000}$
- B: $\frac{999}{1000}$
- C: Don't know yet, more info needed, but less than $\frac{1}{2}$
- D: Don't know yet, more info needed, but more than $\frac{1}{2}$

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- Heterosexual male, has family, no drugs, no risk behavior.

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Decision: guilty or not? (people of CA vs Collins, 1968) [4]

- ▶ Robbery, LA 1964, fuzzy evidence of the offenders:
 - ► female, around 65 kg
 - wearing something dark
 - hair of light color, between light and dark blond, in a ponytail
- At the same time, additional evidence close to the crime scene:
 - loud scream, yelling, looking at the this direction
 - ► a woman sitting into a yellow car
 - car starts immediately and passes close to the additional witness
 - a black man with beard and moustache was driving
- ▶ No more evidence
- Testimony of both the victim and the witness not unambiguous (didn't recognize suspects)
- Still, the suspects were sentenced to jail.

Notes

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Wrong use of independence assumption:

$$P(\text{yellow car}) = 1/10$$
 $P(\text{man with moustache}) = 1/4$
 $P(\text{black man with beard}) = 1/10$
 $P(\text{woman with pony tail}) = 1/10$
 $P(\text{woman blond hair}) = 1/3$

and mistakenly confusing probability

P(randomly selected pair matches discussed characteristics)

1/1000

P(mix race pair in a car)

giving P = 1/12000000 with the needed conditional probability:


P(a pair matching characteristics is guilty)

"The court noted that the correct statistical inference would be the probability that no other couple who could

have committed the robbery had the same traits as the defendants given that at least one couple had the identified traits. The court noted, in an appendix to its decision, that using this correct statistical inference, even if the prosecutor's statistics were all correct and independent as he assumed, the probability that the defendants were

innecent would be ever 40%" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poople v. Colling

Classification example: What's the fish?



- ► Factory for fish processing
- \triangleright 2 classes $s_{1,2}$:
 - salmon
 - sea bass
- Features \vec{x} : length, width, lightness etc. from a camera

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Notes -

- Sea (European) bass, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_bass. In czech it is Mořčák evropský or Mořský vlk.
- Salmon, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salmon, is Losos in Czech.

Fish – classification using probability

$$posterior = \frac{\textit{likelihood} \times \textit{prior}}{\textit{evidence}}$$

- Notation for classification problem
 - ▶ Classes $s_j \in \mathcal{S}$ (e.g., salmon, sea bass)
 - Features $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ or feature vectors $(\vec{x_i})$ (also called attributes)
- ightharpoonup Optimal classification of \vec{x}

$$\delta^*(\vec{x}) = \arg\max_i P(s_j|\vec{x})$$

- We thus choose the most probable class for a given feature vector
- ▶ Both likelihood and prior are taken into account recall Bayes rule:

$$P(s_j|\vec{x}) = \frac{P(\vec{x}|s_j)P(s_j)}{P(\vec{x})}$$

► Can we do (classify) better?

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Notes -

Assuming we know the true $P(\vec{x}|s_i)$, $P(s_i)$, $P(\vec{x})$ we cannot do better! Bayesian decision is the optimal one!

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Bayes classification in practice

- ▶ Usually, we are not given $P(s|\vec{x})$
- ▶ It has to be estimated from already classified examples training data
- ▶ For discrete \vec{x} , training examples $(\vec{x}_1, s_1), (\vec{x}_2, s_2), \dots (\vec{x}_l, s_l)$
 - so-called i.i.d (independent, identically distributed) multiset
 - \triangleright every $(\vec{x_i}, s)$ is drawn independently from $P(\vec{x}, s)$
- Without knowing anything about the distribution, a non-parametric estimate.

$$P(s|\vec{x}) pprox rac{\# ext{ examples where } \vec{x}_i = \vec{x} ext{ and } s_i = s}{\# ext{ examples where } \vec{x}_i = \vec{x}}$$

- Hard in practice
 - To reliably estimate $P(s|\vec{x})$, the number of examples grows exponentially with the number of elements of \vec{x} .
 - e.g. with the number of pixels in images
 - curse of dimensionality
 - ► denominator often ∩

Notes -

Why hard? Way too many various \vec{x} . Think about simple binary 10×10 image - \vec{x} contains 0, 1, position matters. What is the total number of unique images? Think binary, 1×8 binary image? It is very hard almost impossible to sample – collect training data – joint probability distribution.

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Naïve Bayes classification

- ▶ For efficient classification we must thus rely on additional assumptions.
- In the exceptional case of statistical independence between \vec{x} components for each class s it holds

$$P(\vec{x}|s) = P(x[1]|s) \cdot P(x[2]|s) \cdot \dots$$

Use simple Bayes law and maximize:

$$P(s|\vec{x}) = \frac{P(\vec{x}|s)P(s)}{P(\vec{x})} = \frac{P(s)}{P(\vec{x})}P(x[1]|s) \cdot P(x[2]|s) \cdot \ldots =$$

- No combinatorial curse in estimating P(s) and P(x[i]|s) separately for each i and s.
- No need to estimate $P(\vec{x})$. (Why?)
- \triangleright P(s) may be provided apriori.
- naïve = when used despite statistical dependence

Notes -

Why naïve at all? Consider N- dimensional space, 8-bit values. Instead of problem 8^N we have $8\times N$ problem. Think about statistical independence. Example1: person's weight and height. Are they independent? Example2: pixel values in images.

We will talk about learning classifiers more in next lectures.

- ► An important feature of intelligent systems
 - make the best possible decision
 - in uncertain conditions
- **Example**: Take a tram OR subway from A to B?
 - Tram: timetables imply a quicker route, but adherence uncertain.
 - Subway: longer route, but adherence almost certain.
- **Example**: where to route a letter with this ZIP?

- **15700?** 15706? 15200? 15206?
- ► What is the optimal decision
- Both examples fall into the same framework.

Notes -

There are *costs* associated with a decision. E.g. at fish packing plant, customers may not mind so much if some pieces of salmon end up in sea bass cans, but they will be protesting if the opposite happens. So making an error "one way" has higher cost than "the other way". This impacts where decision boundaries for classification should optimally be drawn.

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- ▶ 3 dishes (decisions) in his repertoire:
 - ▶ nothing ... don't bother cooking ⇒ no work but makes wife upset
 - pizza . . . microwave a frozen pizza ⇒ not much work but won't impres
 - $ightharpoonup g.T.c.\dots$ general Tso's chicken \Rightarrow will make her day, but very laborious.
- Hassle incurred by the individual options depends wife's feeling
- For each of the 9 possible situation (3 possible decisions \times 3 possible states) the hassle is quantified by a loss function I(d,s):

Wife's state of mind is an uncertain state

Notes -

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Was the state known the decision would be simple.

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- For each of the 9 possible situation (3 possible decisions \times 3 possible states) the hassle is quantified by a loss function I(d,s):

I(s,d)	d = nothing	d = pizza	d = g.T.c.
s = good	0	2	4
s = average	5	3	5
$s = \mathit{bad}$	10	9	6

Wife's state of mind is an uncertain state.

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Notes -

Was the state known the decision would be simple.

- ▶ Wife coming back from work. Husband: what to cook for dinner?
- ▶ 3 dishes (decisions) in his repertoire:
 - ▶ nothing ... don't bother cooking ⇒ no work but makes wife upset
 - ▶ pizza ... microwave a frozen pizza ⇒ not much work but won't impress
 - ▶ g.T.c. ... general Tso's chicken \Rightarrow will make her day, but very laborious.
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- Husband's experiment. He tells her he accidentally overtaped their wedding video and observes her reaction.
- Anticipates 4 possible reactions:
 - mild . . . all right, we keep our memories.
 - irritated ... how many times do I have to tell you....
 - upset . . . Why did I marry this guy?
 - alarming . . . silence
- ▶ The reaction is a measurable attribute ("feature") of the mind state.
- From experience, the husband knows how individual reactions are probable in each state of mind; this is captured by the joint distribution P(x,s).

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Joint distibution. Husband tried similar experiment multiple times, gathered some evidence ... Instead of complicated experiment with overtaping wedding video, think about asking "when are you coming home?".

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Decision strategy

- Decision strategy: a rule selecting a decision for any given value of the measured attribute(s).
- ▶ i.e. function $d = \delta(x)$.
- Example of husband's possible strategies:

- ► How many strategies?
- ▶ How to define which strategy is best? How to sort them by quality?
- ▶ Define the risk of a strategy as a mean (expected) loss value

$$r(\delta) = \sum_{x} \sum_{s} l(s, \delta(x)) P(x, s)$$

Notes -

Overall, $3^4 = 81$ possible strategies (3 possible decisions for each of the 4 possible attribute values). There is some analogy of states and possible actions. Here, we reason about states - which are 3 (state of mind) - from features which are 4.

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Do we need to evaluate all possible strategies? P(x,s) = P(s|x)P(x)

Notes -

- Risk depends on strategy (decisions).
- Strategy (decisions) depends on observation.
- Loss combines decision and state.
- The total weighted average is weighted by joint probability of observation and state.

Calculate $r(\delta_1)$ and $r(\delta_2)$, which strategy is better?

I(s, a)	d = nothing	$g a = p_{izza}$	a = g.1.c	<u>. </u>
s = good	0	2	4	_
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Bayes optimal strategy

► The Bayes optimal strategy : one minimizing mean risk.

$$\delta^* = \arg\min_{\delta} r(\delta)$$

From P(x,s) = P(s|x)P(x) (Bayes rule), we have

$$r(\delta) = \sum_{x} \sum_{s} I(s, \delta(x)) P(x, s) = \sum_{s} \sum_{x} I(s, \delta(x)) P(s|x) P(x)$$
$$= \sum_{x} P(x) \underbrace{\sum_{s} I(s, \delta(x)) P(s|x)}_{\text{Conditional right}}$$

▶ The optimal strategy is obtained by minimizing the conditional risk *separately* for each *x*:

$$\delta^*(x) = \arg\min_{d} \sum_{s} I(s, d) P(s|x)$$

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Notes -

Optimal strategy: $\delta^*(x) = \arg\min_d \sum_s I(s, d) P(s|x)$

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$\delta(x)$	x = mild	x = irritated	x = upset	x = alarming	
$\delta^*(x) =$??	??	??	??	

Notes -

We need to recompute the table of joint probability P(s,x) into table of conditional probabilies P(s|x).

This can be done in two ways. A: Using product rule, P(s|x) = P(s,x)/P(x).

First, to get $P(x)$, we use Sum rule (marginalizing).		x = mild	x = irritated	x = upset	x = alarming
	P(x)	0.39	0.40	0.16	0.05

Second, applying product rule, P(s|x) = P(s,x)/P(x).

B: calculating the probability on a "per column basis".

E.g. for the first cell, A: 0.35/0.39 = 0.897 B: 0.35/(0.35 + 0.04)

0	,	/	/ (-		
P(s x)	x = mild	x = irritated	x = upset	x = alarming	
s = good	0.897	0.7	0.438	0.00	Having the table of all $P(s x)$ we just
s = average	0.103	0.25	0.25	0.4	Having the table of all $F(s x)$ we just
s = bad	0.00	0.125	0.313	0.6	

mechanically insert into the equation in the slide title.

Statistical decision making: wrapping up

► Given:

- ightharpoonup A set of possible states : \mathcal{S}
- ightharpoonup A set of possible decisions : \mathcal{D}
- ▶ A loss function $I: \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \Re$
- ightharpoonup The range \mathcal{X} of the attribute
- ▶ Distribution P(x, s), $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $s \in \mathcal{S}$.

► Define:

- ► Strategy : function $\delta: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{D}$
- **Proof** Risk of strategy $\delta : r(\delta) = \sum_{x} \sum_{s} l(s, \delta(x)) P(x, s)$

▶ Bayes problem:

- ▶ Goal: find the optimal strategy $\delta^* = \arg \min_{\delta \in \Delta} r(\delta)$
- Solution: $\delta^*(x) = \arg\min_d \sum_s I(s, d) P(s|x)$

- ▶ Bayesian classification is a special case of statistical decision theory:
 - Attribute vector $\vec{x} = (x_1, x_2, ...)$: pixels 1, 2,
 - ▶ State set S = decision set $D = \{0, 1, \dots 9\}$.
 - ► State = actual class, Decision = recognized class
 - Loss function:

$$I(s,d) = \begin{cases} 0, & d=s \\ 1, & d \neq s \end{cases}$$

$$\delta^*(\vec{x}) = \arg\min_{d} \sum_{s} \underbrace{I(s, d)}_{0 \text{ if } d = s} P(s|\vec{x}) = \arg\min_{d} \sum_{s \neq d} P(s|\vec{x})$$

Obviously $\sum_s P(s|\vec{x}) = 1$, then:

$$P(d|\vec{x}) + \sum_{s \neq d} P(s|\vec{x}) = 1$$

Inserting into above:

$$\delta^*(\vec{x}) = \arg\min_{\vec{q}} [1 - P(d|\vec{x})] = \arg\max_{\vec{q}} P(d|\vec{x})$$

Notes -

- Classification as opposed to Decision
- Loss function simply counts errors (misclassifications)
- We consider all errors equally painful!
- More examples during the lab ...
- The final result is not that surprising, is it? (Is it good or bad?)

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References I

Further reading: Chapter 13 and 14 of [6]. Books [1] and [2] are classical textbooks in the field of pattern recognition and machine learning. An interesting insights into how people think and interact with probabilities are presented in [4] (in Czech as [5])

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