

Uncertainty, Chances, and Utilities


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Outline

Deterministic opponent \rightarrow stochastic environment



b_1, b_2, b_3 - probable branches, uncertain outcomes of a_1 action.


Why? Actions may fail, ...



Video: Slipping robot

Vision for Robotics and Autonomous Systems, <http://cyber.felk.cvut.cz/vras>

Why? Actions may fail, ..., getting to work



Random variable: Situation on rails


r_1 free rails

r_2 accident

r_3 congestion

MAX/MIN depends on what the b_i options and terminal numbers mean.

Chance nodes values



- ▶ Average case, not the **worst** case.
- ▶ Calculate **expected utilities** ...
- ▶ i.e. take weighted average (expectation) of successors

Expectimax


```
function EXPECTIMAX(state) return a value
  if TERMINAL-TEST(state): return UTILITY(state)
  if state (next agent) is MAX: return MAX-VALUE(state)
  if state (next agent) is CHANCE: return EXP-VALUE(state)
end function
```

```
function MAX-VALUE(state) return value  $v$ 
   $v \leftarrow -\infty$ 
  for  $a$  in ACTIONS(state) do
     $v \leftarrow \max(v, \text{EXPECTIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(\text{state}, a)))$ 
  end for
end function
```

```
function EXP-VALUE(state) return value  $v$ 
   $v \leftarrow 0$ 
  for all  $r \in$  random events do
     $v \leftarrow v + P(r) \text{EXPECTIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(\text{state}, r))$ 
  end for
end function
```

Random variables, probability distribution, ...

- ▶ **Random variable** - an event with unknown outcome
- ▶ **Probability distribution** - assignment of weights to the outcomes



- ▶ Random variable: r - situation on rails
- ▶ Outcomes: $r \in \{\text{free rails, accident, congestion}\}$
- ▶ Probability distribution: $P(r = \text{free rails}) = 0.3$,
 $P(r = \text{accident}) = 0.1$, $P(r = \text{congestion}) = 0.6$

Few reminders from laws of probability, **Probabilities**:

- ▶ always non-negative,
- ▶ sum over all possible outcomes is equal to 1.

Expectations, ...

How long does it take to go to work by tram?


- ▶ Depends on the random variable r - situation on rails.
- ▶ What is the **expectation**?

$$t = P(r_1)t_1 + P(r_2)t_2 + P(r_3)t_3$$

Weighted average.

How about the Reversi game?

Games with chances **and** strategy



Mixing MAX, CHANCE, and MIN nodes

MAX


CHANCE

MIN



CHANCE

MAX

TERMINAL



Mixing layer types - chances inserted



Extra random agent that moves after each MAX and MIN agent

$$\text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(s) =$$


$$\text{UTILITY}(s) \quad \text{if} \quad \text{TERMINAL-TEST}(s)$$

$$\max_a \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s, a)) \quad \text{if} \quad \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{MAX}$$

$$\min_a \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s, a)) \quad \text{if} \quad \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{MIN}$$


$$\sum_r P(r) \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s, r)) \quad \text{if} \quad \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{CHANCE}$$

Mixing chances into min/max tree, how big?




- ▶ b branching factor
- ▶ m maximum depth
- ▶ n number of distinct rolls

Evaluation function



- ▶ Scale matters! Not only ordering.
- ▶ Can we prune the tree? (α, β like?)


Pruning expectiminimax tree



Bounds on terminal utilities needed.

Multi player games

to move



- ▶ Utility tuples
- ▶ Each player maximizes its own
- ▶ Coalitions, cooperations, competitions may be dynamic

Uncertainty recap



- ▶ Uncertain outcome of an action.
- ▶ Robot/Agent may not know the current state!

Uncertain, partially observable environment

- ▶ Current state s may be unknown, **observations** \mathbf{e}
- ▶ Uncertain outcome, random variable $\text{RESULT}(a)$
- ▶ Probability of outcome s' given \mathbf{e} is

$$P(\text{RESULT}(a) = s' | a, \mathbf{e})$$

- ▶ Utility function $U(s)$ corresponds to agent preferences.
- ▶ Expected utility of an action a given \mathbf{e} :

$$EU(a|\mathbf{e}) = \sum_{s'} P(\text{RESULT}(a) = s' | a, \mathbf{e}) U(s')$$



Rational agent

Agent's expected utility of an action a given \mathbf{e} :

$$EU(a|\mathbf{e}) = \sum_{s'} P(\text{RESULT}(a) = s' | a, \mathbf{e}) U(s')$$

What should a rational agent do?

Is it then all solved?

- ▶ $P(\text{RESULT}(a) = s' | a, \mathbf{e})$
- ▶ $U(s')$

Utilities



- ▶ Where do utilities come from?
- ▶ Does averaging make sense?
- ▶ Do they exist?
- ▶ What if our preferences can't be described by utilities?

Agent/Robot Preferences

- ▶ Prizes A, B
- ▶ Lottery: uncertain prizes $L = [p, A; (1 - p), B]$

Preference, indifference, ...


- ▶ Robot prefers A over B : $A \succ B$
- ▶ Robot has no preferences: $A \sim B$
- ▶ in between: $A \succsim B$

Rational preferences


- ▶ Transitivity
- ▶ Orderability (Completeness)
- ▶ Continuity
- ▶ Substituability
- ▶ Monotonicity
- ▶ Decomposability

Transitivity and decomposability


Goods A, B, C and agent (nontransitive) preferences $A \succ B \succ C \succ A$.



(a)



is equivalent to



(b)

Maximum expected utility principle

Given the rational preferences (constraints), there exists a real valued function U such that:

$$U(A) > U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succ B$$

$$U(A) = U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \sim B$$

Expected utility of a Lottery L :

$$L([p_1, S_1; \dots ; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$$

Proof in [3].

Is a utility U unique?



Human utilities



Utility of money

You triumphed in a TV show!

- a) Take \$1,000,000 ... or
- b) Flip a coin and loose all or win \$2,500,000



References

Some figures from [2]. Human utilities are discussed in [1]. This lecture has been greatly inspired by the 7th lecture of CS 188 at <http://ai.berkeley.edu> as it conveniently bridges the world of deterministic search and sequential decisions in uncertain worlds.

[1] Daniel Kahneman.

Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

[2] Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig.

Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.

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[3] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Games_and_Economic_Behavior, Utility theorem.