

Extensive-Form Games

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

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Previously ... on multi-agent systems (tutorials and lectures).

- 1 Different representations:
 - Normal-Form Games (game matrixes)
 - Extensive-Form Games (game trees)
- 2 Algorithms for computing different solution concepts:
 - Nash equilibrium
 - Correlated equilibrium
 - Stackelberg equilibrium

Task 1: Consider following games. Write down a normal-form representation for these games.



Task 2: Formulate the following game of a small “poker” as an EFG.

- there is an ante of 1\$
- there is a limited deck of cards $\{J, J, Q, Q\}$
- each player receives a card
- player 1 either folds or bets 2\$
- player 2 either calls or folds
- player with the higher card wins

Task 3: A *mixed-integer linear program (MILP)* is a linear program that includes integer variables. Formulate the problem of computing a NE in a general-sum game as a MILP.

Task 4: Either prove the following statement or give a counterexample: Every convex combination of two different NE is a Correlated equilibrium.

Task 5: Find a Correlated equilibrium that is not a convex combination of NE.