https://cw.fel.cvut.cz/b172/ 2026-05-06T01:07:12+0200 https://cw.fel.cvut.cz/b172/ https://cw.fel.cvut.cz/b172/lib/tpl/bulma-cw/images/favicon.ico text/html 2018-05-28T15:59:16+0200 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://cw.fel.cvut.cz/b172/courses/xep36agt/assignments?rev=1527515956&do=diff Class projects No regret learning In the lecture, we will show that the empirical frequencies of actions of two no regret learning algorithms (in adversarial setting) playing each other in a finite zero-sum game converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game at rate O(1/√T). There are three related questions you can investigate in the assignment. text/html 2018-03-23T20:39:53+0200 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://cw.fel.cvut.cz/b172/courses/xep36agt/start?rev=1521833993&do=diff XEP36AGT – Algoritmická teorie her Advanced course for algorithmic topics in game theory. Please, see Lectures for further details. A list of suggestions for the topic of the home assignments.