

## Multiagent Resource Allocation 1

<u>Agent Technology Center</u>, Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, FEE, Czech Technical University


AE4M36MAS Autumn 2014 - Lecture 11


Where are We?

Agent architectures (inc. BDI architecture) Logics for MAS Non-cooperative game theory Cooperative game theory Resource allocation and Auctions

Social choice

Distributed constraint reasoning





#### Lecture Online

#### Introduction

#### **Resource Allocation**

- Type of resources
- Preference representation
- Social Welfare

#### **Auction Mechanisms**

- Basic Definitions
- Single-good auction mechanisms
- Analysis of auction mechanisms


### Auctions: Traditional

Auctions used in Babylon as early as 500 B.C. but used to be rare (not so long ago)

Stage 0: No automation



### Auctions: Partial Automation




Grown massively with the Web/Internet

→ Frictionless commerce: feasible to auction things that weren't previously profitable

## Phase 1: Computers used to manage auctions / run auction protocols



### Auctions: (Almost) Full automation



**Phase 2**: Computer used to also automate decision making of bidders

Concerns:

(1) the most relevant adds shown and

(2) auctioner's profit maximized

Pizza West - Praha - pizzawest.cz www.pizzawest.cz/ ▼ Pizza a jiná jídla až na váš stůl do práce nebo doma. Sleva 5% On line menu - O nás - Denní menu - Rezervace ♥ Nám. bratří Synků 5/1, Praha 4 - 261 215 740

### Lots of Applications

Industrial procurement

Transport and logistics

Energy markets

Cloud and grid computing

Internet auctions

Electromagnetic spectrum allocation

... and counting!

Multiagent Resource Allocation (MARA)

### What is Multiagent Resource Allocation?

## Multiagent Resource Allocation (MARA) is the process of distributing a number of items amongst a number of agents.

- What kind of items (resources) are being distributed?
- **How** are they being distributed?
- Why are they being distributed?

### Classification of MARA

- 1. Resources
- 2. Agent preferences
- 3. Social welfare
- 4. Allocation mechanism

## Type of Resources

### Types of Resources

Central parameter in any resource allocation problem.

Different **types** of resources may require different resource allocation **techniques**.

Inherent **properties** of the **resource** vs. **characteristics** of the chosen **mechanism**.

### Types of Resources (cntd.)

#### Continuous vs. Discrete resources

- physical property of the resource
- e.g. energy vs. fruit
- discrete resources are indivisible
- continuous resources may be treated either as being divisible or as being indivisible (→ discretisation)

#### Divisible vs. Indivisible resource

- resource may be treated as divisible or indivisible (e.g. 50l of juice)
- chosen feature of the allocation mechanism (possibly implied by resource physical properties)

### Type of Resources (cntd.)

**Sharable** resource can be allocated to a number of different agents at the same time

- e.g. a photo taken by an earth observation satellite
- more often resource are non-sharable

**Static** resources do not change their properties during a negotiation process

non-static: e.g. perishable goods (such as food)

### Type of Resources (cntd.)

#### Single-unit vs. Multi-unit resources

- single-unit: exactly one copy of each type of good; all items are distinguishable (e.g. several houses).
- multi-unit: there may be several copies of the same type of good (e.g. 10 bottles of wine).

#### Distinction is only a matter of **representation**

- Every multi-unit problem can be translated into a single-unit problem by introducing new names (inefficient, but possible).
- Multi-unit problems allow a more compact representation but require a richer language.

Tasks may be considered resources with **negative** utility (cost).

**Task allocation** may be regarded a multiagent resource allocation problem.

 However, tasks are often coupled with constraints regarding their coherent combination (timing and ordering).

## Preference Representation

#### **Preference Representation**

The second important parameter in the specification of a MARA problem.

- Agents may have preferences over
  - the bundle of resources they receive
  - the bundles of resources received by others (externalities)

What are suitable **languages** for representing agent **preferences**?

### Preference Representation Languages

**Expressive power** 

Succinctness

Complexity

Cognitive relevance

Elicitation

### Cardinal vs. Ordinal Preferences

A **preference structure** represents an agent's preferences over a set of alternatives  $\mathcal{X}$  (i.e. allocations).

- Cardinal preference structure is a function  $u: \mathcal{X} \mapsto Val$ , where Val is usually a set of numerical values such as  $\mathbb{N}$  or  $\mathbb{R}$ .
- Ordinal preference structure is a binary relation ≤ over the set of alternatives, that is reflexive and transitive (and connected).

If the alternatives over which agents have to express preferences are *bundles of indivisible resources* from the set  $\mathcal{R}$ , then we have  $\mathcal{X} = 2^{\mathcal{R}}$ .

#### Some Observations

**Intrapersonal comparison**: ordinal and cardinal preferences allow for comparing the satisfaction of an agent for different alternatives.

**Interpersonal comparison**: ordinal preferences don't allow for interpersonal comparison ("Ann likes x more than Bob likes y").

**Preference intensity**: ordinal preferences cannot express preference intensity; cardinal preferences can (subject to Val being numerical).

**Representability**: a connected ordinal preference relation  $\leq$  is representable by a utility function  $u: x \leq y$  iff  $u(x) \leq u(x)$ .

**Cognitive relevance**: hard to make general statements, but at least ordinal preferences don't require reasoning with numerical utilities.

**Explicit representation**: the explicit representations of cardinal and ordinal preferences have space complexity  $\mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{X}|)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{X}|^2)$ , respectively.



Hanging a frame (f) with a hammer (h) and a nail (n) . . .

Card	inal	Ordinal									
В	u(B)	$\succeq$	{ }	$\{f\}$	$\{h\}$	$\{n\}$	$\{f,n\}$	$\{f,h\}$	$\{h,n\}$	$\{f,h,n\}$	
{ }	0	{ }	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	
$\{f \}$	10	$\{f\}$	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	
$\{h\}$	5	$\{h\}$	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	
$\{n\}$	0	$\{n\}$	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	
$\{f,n\}$	10	$\{f,n\}$	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	
$\{f,h\}$	15	$\{f,h\}$	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
$\{h,n\}$	8	$\{h,n\}$	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	
$\{f,h,n\}$	20	$\{f,h,n\}$	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

#### Social Welfare

# A third parameter in the specification of a MARA problem concerns our goals: what kind of allocation do we want to achieve?

We use the term **social welfare** in a very broad sense to describe **metrics** for assessing the **quality** of an **allocation** of resources.

### Efficiency and Fairness

Two key indicators of social welfare.

#### Aspects of **efficiency\*** include:

- The chosen agreement should be such that there is no alternative agreement that would be better for some and not worse for any of the other agents (Pareto optimality).
- If preferences are quantitative, the sum of all payoffs should be as high as possible (utilitarianism).

#### Aspects of **fairness** include:

- No agent should prefer to take the bundle allocated to one of its peers rather than keeping their own (envy-freeness).
- The agent that is going to be worst off should be as well off as possible (egalitarianism).

\*not in the computational sense

#### Notation

Set of **agents**  $\mathcal{A} = \{1, \dots, n\}$ 

Agents have **preferences over allocations**:

- ordinal:  $A \preccurlyeq_i A'$  means agent *i* likes A no less than A'
- cardinal:  $u_i(A) = x \in \mathbb{R}$  means agent *i* assigns utility *x* to A

### Utilitarian Social Welfare

#### **Utilitarian Collective Utility**

The **utilitarian** collective utility function  $sw_u$  is defined as the sum of individual utilities:

$$sw_u(A) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}} u_i(A)$$

Maximizing utilitarian CUF improves efficiency.

The utilitarian CUF is **zero-independent**: adding a constant value to your utility function won't a affect social welfare judgements.

### Egalitarian Social Welfare

#### **Egalitarian Collective Utility**

The **egalitarian** collective utility function  $sw_e$  is defined as the sum of individual utilities:

 $sw_e(A) = \min\{u_i(A) | i \in \mathcal{A}\}$ 

Maximising this function amounts to improving the situation of the weakest members of society ( $\rightarrow$  fairness).

Allocation A' is strictly preferred over allocation A (by society) iff  $sw_e(A) < sw_e(A')$  holds (so-called **maximin**-ordering).

### Nash Product Social Welfare

#### **Nash Collective Utility**

The **Nash** collective utility function  $sw_e$  is defined as the sum of individual utilities:

$$sw_e(A) = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{A}} u_i(A)$$

This is a useful measure of social welfare as long as all utility functions can be assumed to be **positive**.

Nash CUF favours increases in overall utility, but also inequality-reducing redistributions  $(2 \cdot 6 < 4 \cdot 4)$ .

The Nash CUF is **scale independent**: whether a particular agent measures their own utility in euros or dollars does not affect social welfare judgements.

#### Social Welfare Curve Illustration

## **Allocation Procedures**

#### **Allocation Procedures**

Solution of a MARA problem need to determine at least:

- Protocols: What types of deals are possible? What messages do agents have to exchange to agree on one such deal?
- Strategies: What strategies may an agent use for a given protocol? How can we give incentives to agents to behave in a certain way?
- Algorithms: How do we solve the computational problems faced by agents when engaged in negotiation?

### Centralised vs. Distributed Allocation

#### **Centralised case**

- A single entity decides on the final allocation, possibly after having elicited the preferences of the other agents.
- Example: combinatorial auctions

#### Distributed case

- Allocations emerge as the result of a sequence of local negotiation steps.
- Such local steps may or may not be subject to structural restrictions (say, bilateral deals).

Which approach is appropriate under what circumstances?

### Centralised vs. Distributed Comparison

#### Centralised

- The **communication** protocols required are relatively **simple**.
- Many results from economics and game theory, in particular on mechanism design, can be exploited.
- **Powerful algorithms** for winner determination in combinatorial auctions.
- Possible trust issues.
- Difficult to deal with unbounded problems.

#### Distributed

- Avoids **trust** issues.
- Inherently scalable.
- Can take an **initial allocation** into account.
- More natural to model **stepwise improvements** over the status quo.
- Can deal with **unbounded domains**.
- More complex protocols significantly more difficult to analyse (convergence etc.)

#### What is an Auction?

An **auction** is a protocol that allows agents (=bidders) to indicate their **interests** in one or more **resources** and that uses these indications of interest to determine both an **allocation** of resources and a set of **payments** by the agents. [Shoham & Leyton-Brown 2009] Market-based price setting: for objects of unknown value, the value is dynamically assessed by the market!

Flexible: any object type can be allocated

#### Can be **automated**

- use of simple rules reduces complexity of negotiations
- well-suited for computer implementation

Revenue-maximising and efficient allocations are achievable

#### **Auctions Rules**

#### Auction mechanism is specified by auction rules

rules of the game

#### Bidding rules: How offers are made:

- by whom
- when
- what their content is

**Clearing rules**: Who gets which goods (**allocation**) and what money changes hands (**payment**).

**Information rules**: What information about the state of the negotiation is revealed to whom and when.

### Valuation Models

#### Agent's payoff from participating in an auction

- if winner: payoff = item's valuation price paid for the item
- if not winner: payoff = zero

**Common value**: the good has the same value to all agents

a 100 dollar note


**Private value:** an agent A's valuation of the good is independent from other agent's valuation of the good

a painting, John Lennon's last dollar bill


#### **Correlated value**: valuations of the good are related

- i.e. the more other agents are prepared to pay, the more agent A prepared to pay.
- i.e. purchase of items for later resale


### Single Good Auctions



#### **Multi-Unit Auctions**




#### **Multi-Item Auctions**



OPEN INFORMATICS / MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS: MULTIAGENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION

#### **Reverse Auctions**



FRONT SUSPENSION, FRONT WHEEL BEARING ACQUISITION

 Goal: Buy parts to produce a front suspension.

 The buyer issues a request for bids to his providers.

PART #	DESCRIPTION
1	FRONT HUB
7	LOWER CONTROL ARM BUSHINGS
8	STRUT
9	COIL SPRING
14	STABILIZER BAR

### Multi-Attribute Auctions

#### Negotiation over other attributes in addition to price


• e.g. color, weight, or delivery time

For instance: Provider John Doe offers to deliver a stainless-steel stabilizer bar that weighs 500 g at the cost of 200 EUR by July 18th 2011.

Promise **higher market efficiency** through a more **effective information exchange** of buyer's preferences and supplier's offerings.

Least understood type of auctions.

### Auction Mechanism Taxonomy



Other: First-price vs. *k*-th price, open cry vs. sealed bid, single. vs. double-sided, sell-side vs. buy-side

# Single-Item Auctions

#### **Basic Auction Mechanisms**

English

Japanese

Dutch

First-Price

Second-Price

### **English Auction**

## Auctioneer starts the bidding at some **reservation price**

# Bidders then shout out ascending prices

minimum increments

Once bidders stop shouting, the *high bidder* gets the good at that price




#### Japanese Auctions

Same as an English auction except that the auctioneer calls out the prices

All bidders start out standing

When the price reaches a level that a bidder is not willing to pay, that bidder **sits down** 

Once a bidder sits down, they **can't get back up** the **last** person **standing** gets the good




### **Dutch Auction**

The auctioneer starts a clock at some high value; it descends

At some point, a bidder shouts "mine!" and gets the good at the price shown on the clock

Good when items need to be sold quickly (similar to Japanese)

No information is given away during auction



### First-, Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions

#### First-price sealed bid auction

- bidders write down bids on pieces of paper
- auctioneer awards the good to the bidder with the highest bid
- that bidder pays the amount of his bid

Second-price sealed bid auction (Vickerey auction)

- bidders write down bids on pieces of paper
- auctioneer awards the good to the bidder with the highest bid
- that bidder pays the amount bid by the secondhighest bidder





### Intuitive Comparison

	$\mathbf{English}$	$\operatorname{Dutch}$	Japanese	$1^{ ext{st}} ext{-Price}$	$2^{ ext{nd}} ext{-} ext{Price}$
Duration	#bidders, increment	starting price, clock speed	#bidders, increment	fixed	fixed
Info Revealed	2 <sup>nd</sup> -highest val; bounds	winner's bid	all val's but winner's	none	none
Jump bids	on others yes	n/a	no	n/a	n/a
Price Discovery	yes	no	yes	no	no